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Abstract—Detecting adversarial examples currently stands as
one of the biggest challenges in the field of deep learning. Ad-
versarial attacks, which produce adversarial examples, increase
the prediction likelihood of a target class for a particular data
point. During this process, the adversarial example can be further
optimized, even when it has already been wrongly classified with
100% confidence, thus making the adversarial example even more
difficult to detect. For this kind of adversarial examples, which
we refer to as over-optimized adversarial examples, we discovered
that the logits of the model provide solid clues on whether the
data point at hand is adversarial or genuine. In this context,
we first discuss the masking effect of the softmax function for
the prediction made and explain why the logits of the model are
more useful in detecting over-optimized adversarial examples.
To identify this type of adversarial examples in practice, we
propose a non-parametric and computationally efficient method
which relies on interquartile range, with this method becoming
more effective as the image resolution increases. We support our
observations throughout the paper with detailed experiments for
different datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet) and several
architectures.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even though deep convolutional architectures outperform
other models on various image-related problems such as image
classification [1], object detection [2], and segmentation [3], it
has been shown that these models are not foolproof. A recent
development called adversarial examples currently counts as
one of the major issues these models are facing. Adversarial
examples were first discovered by [4] while searching for
intriguing properties of neural networks. Although there is no
clear definition of adversarial example, we will say that a data
point is called adversarial if it is perturbed to be misclassified.
The earliest methods to generate adversarial examples
mostly rely on optimizing an input for a specific target class
using a gradient-based algorithm, hence forcing the data point
under consideration to be classified in another category [4, 5].
To improve the effectiveness of adversarial example gener-
ation, a variety of methods based on different optimization
techniques were introduced. Some examples are: finding the
closest distance to the decision boundary [6], Fast-Gradient
Sign (FGS) [7], Jacobian-based Saliency Maps (JSMA) [8],
and the recently introduced Carlini & Wagner attack (CW) [9].
The latter is currently regarded as the strongest attack, given
that it can incorporate defense mechanisms into the optimiza-
tion procedure, thus making it possible to generate strong
adversarial examples that are able to circumvent these defense
mechanisms [9].
As attacks get more effective with every study, new defense
mechanisms are also introduced to counter them. The intuitive
approach of adversarial re-training was the first method tested
to prevent this problem [7]. [10] applied adversarial re-training
on ImageNet [11] and found that it counters certain attacks.
Another mechanism to prevent adversarial examples was intro-
duced by [12], showing that network distillation provides some
defense against adversarial examples generated with JSMA.
[13] suggested extracting a binary threshold from the output
of each rectifier layer (ReLU) and utilizing these thresholds
with a quantized radial basis support vector machine detector
to distinguish adversarial examples from genuine images. The
most impactful research on adversarial defense mechanisms
has thus far been performed by [14], who showed that none of
the proposed defense mechanisms so far are effective against
strong attacks and that the properties of currently available
defense mechanisms do not scale well to higher resolution
images, e.g., from MNIST images to ImageNet images.
[14] further argued that defense mechanisms should be
evaluated against strong attacks and that they need to demon-
strate that white-box attacks can be prevented. In this context,
an attack is said to be white-box in nature if the attacker
has access to the specifications of the model (weights and
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classes) and is aware of the defense mechanism. However,
assuming the attacker has access to both the model and
the defense mechanism presents an unfair challenge to the
defender. Indeed, the knowledge about the model and the
defense mechanism can then be incorporated into an attack,
making it possible to generate adversarial examples that have
been carefully designed to avoid the defense mechanism under
consideration. In their evaluation of defense techniques, [14]
put two constraints on the generation of adversarial examples,
namely (1) discretization and (2) the amount of perturbation.
We believe this approach may lead to results that need to be
carefully interpreted because, as we will show in this paper, it
is trivial to distinguish natural images from heavily optimized
adversarial examples based on logit values. Therefore, we
claim that not all adversarial examples necessarily require a
complex defense mechanism and that, in fact, a significant
number of them can already be detected by analyzing the logits
of the prediction.
Contributions: In summary, our work makes the following
contributions:
• We discuss the masking effect of the softmax function,
hiding the magnitude of the predicted logit value. This
observation lays the foundation for a novel technique for
identifying adversarial examples, as discussed in more
detail in the remainder of this paper.
• We show that attack mechanisms may generate what we
call over-optimized adversarial examples. These adversar-
ial examples, which have extremely high logit outputs,
can be easily identified when the logits of the prediction
are analyzed.
• We introduce a non-parametric method to calculate a logit
threshold from training data. This threshold can then be
used to identify over-optimized adversarial examples.
• When the resolution of an image increases, we show
that the subspace in which adversarial examples can
be generated also increases substantially. Furthermore,
unlike some of the proposed defense techniques, our
method is able to identify more and more adversarial
examples as the resolution of the given image increases.
We provide evidence for these observations by making
use of the MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet datasets.
II. IMPACT OF ADVERSARIAL OPTIMIZATION ON LOGITS
Methods for adversarial example generation use specific
optimization techniques to increase the chance a given input
is labeled with the targeted class. Most of the proposed opti-
mization techniques are iterative in nature. Indeed, it has been
shown that these techniques produce more effective adversar-
ial examples with less perturbation, compared to single-step
optimization techniques or techniques that facilitate untargeted
attacks [15].
We can simplify the behavior of targeted iterative optimiza-
tion techniques as follows: assume that we have an affine clas-
sifier in a two-dimensional setting, f(x) : R2 → R, separating
the input space into two subspaces f(x) > 0 and f(x) < 0,
with the line f(x) = 0 denoting the decision boundary. This
f(x) = 0
f(x) > 0f(x) < 0
α0
∆1
α1
∆2
α2
∆3
α3
Fig. 1: An illustration of adversarial examples α{1,2,3}, derived
from an input α0, for an affine classifier f(x) = 0, and their
respective distances ∆{1,2,3} = d(α{1,2,3}, f) to the decision
boundary f .
setting is shown in Fig. 1. Under these circumstances, when the
given example α0 is iteratively optimized towards f(x) > 0,
the distances ∆{1,2,3} between the generated adversarial points
α{1,2,3} and the decision boundary are increased at each step,
with the goal to increase the likelihood that the data point
under consideration (that is, α0) is classified as f(x) > 0. To
that end, it does not matter whether the attack uses the logits of
the model (like CW) or not, given that the overall impact of the
optimization techniques used on the logits remains the same.
A more detailed explanation of adversarial optimization and
its impact on the decision boundary for multi-class classifiers
can be found in [6].
In this study, we consider two targeted attacks: (1) Basic
Iterative Method [16], a fast attack that arguably generates
weak adversarial examples, and (2) CW, a slow attack that
generates strong adversarial examples.
A. Basic Iterative Method
Basic Iterative Method, also referred to as Iterative Fast
Gradient Sign (I-FGS), finds its origin in the FGS method
proposed in [7]. FGS performs a one-step update on the input
along the direction of the gradient:
xn+1 = xn − α sign(∇xJ(g(θ,xn)c) ,
where sign(∇xJ(.)) is the signature of the gradient of the
cross-entropy error function and α is the perturbation multi-
plier. This method is characterized as fast since it does not
require an iterative approach.
[16] extended FGS into I-FGS, proposing to use a lower
value for α and to iteratively update the input image:
xn+1 = ClipX,(xn − α sign(∇xJ(g(θ,xn)c) .
In the above equation, the clipping function makes sure that the
resulting adversarial example is a valid image. Furthermore,
the parameter  controls the maximally allowed amount of
perturbation per pixel.
FGS, along with its extension I-FGS, is one of the most
commonly used adversarial attacks to test adversarial defense
mechanisms. However, in this study, we opted for I-FGS over
FGS because I-FGS is shown to produce stronger adversarial
examples [16].
(a) Original Image
Prediction: Arctic Fox
Confidence: 0.99
Logit1: ∼ 20
Logit2: ∼ 5
(b) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 1
Logit1: ∼ 1e2
Logit2: ∼ 10
(c) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 1
Logit1: ∼ 5e2
Logit2: ∼ 12
(d) Adv. Image
Prediction: Radio
Confidence: 1
Logit1: ∼ 4e3
Logit2: ∼ 40
Fig. 2: (a) Original image, predicted as arctic fox with 0.99 confidence. (b)-(c)-(d) Over-optimized adversarial examples which
are predicted with the same confidence but with vastly different logit values by ResNet-50. Logit1 and Logit2 represent the
logits of the most likely and second most likely predictions, respectively.
B. Carlini & Wagner Attack
Even though FGS and I-FGS can generate adversarial
examples with a high success rate, the main focus of these
methods is not to produce strong adversarial examples. In [9],
Carlini and Wagner proposed a heavily optimized attack which
produces strong adversarial examples that can bypass defense
mechanisms easily. In this study, we use the L2 version of
CW, which was also used by Carlini and Wagner to test the
robustness of defense techniques [14]. The L2 version of CW
is defined as follows:
miminize ||x− (x+ δ)||22 + α `(x+ δ) ,
where this attack attempts to find a small perturbation δ that is
sufficient to change the prediction made by the model when it
is added to the input, while keeping the L2 distance between
the original image x and the perturbed image x′ = x + δ
minimal.
In their original work [9], they discussed multiple loss
functions for this kind of attack, and in this study, we use
the loss function they preferred in their later work [14] to
evaluate multiple defense mechanisms. This loss function ` is
constructed as follows:
`(x′) = max {max{g(θ,x′)i : i 6= c} − g(θ,x′)c,−K} ,
(1)
comparing the logit prediction of the target class with the
logit prediction of the next-most-likely class. This method
can also be tuned using K to adjust the strength of the
adversarial example produced. Specifically, as K increases,
the confidence of the prediction for the adversarial example
also increases. They refer to this kind of adversarial examples
as high-confidence adversarial examples.
III. MASKING EFFECT OF THE SOFTMAX FUNCTION
When the prediction of a neural network is analyzed, the
output is usually represented in terms of probabilities. Such
probability is usually referred to as the confidence of the
prediction made. To convert logit values into probabilities, a
normalized exponential function called the softmax function
P (u)k =
euk∑M
m=1 e
um
is used, where u is an input vector such
that u = (u1, . . . , uM )T ∈ RM and k is the selected index of
the vector u [17, 18, 19]. In particular, the softmax function
uses the exponential function to squeeze the input values
between zero and one in such a way that the output values add
up to one. This property makes the softmax function helpful
in more easily interpreting the predictions of a neural network,
instead of having to rely on the logits, which are more difficult
to interpret.
The usage of the softmax function for convolutional neural
networks dates back to 1998 [20], soon thereafter becoming
a common tool to convert logits into probabilitistic values.
However, when investigating adversarial examples, the soft-
max function, when used in settings with limited decimal
precision, has a major drawback for correctly interpreting the
predictions of a neural network: it lacks sensitivity to positive
changes in the magnitude of the largest logit. We detailed this
discovery and its impact on adversarial examples in a previous
study [21].
A. Experimental Results on the Masking Effect of Softmax
To show a practical outcome of the aforementioned limita-
tion of the softmax function for neural networks, we present
Fig. 4, showing a mock-up two-class classification problem
that visualizes the masking effect of the softmax function. A
neural network yˆ = g(θ,x) with a single hidden layer and
ReLU activations is applied to this problem. The approximate
decision boundary is indicated using a dashed line. For those
points lying on the orange line (x2 = 0), Fig. 4 displays
both the predicted logit value max(g(θ,x)) and the predicted
outcome probability max(P (g(θ,x))). It can be seen from
Fig. 4 that the logit values increase as the distance between
the point under consideration and the classification boundary
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(a) I-FGS
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(b) CW
Fig. 3: Highest logit value and corresponding softmax output as a function of the number of iterations when generating
adversarial examples with (a) I-FGS and (b) CW. Adversarial examples are tested on ResNet-50 in a white-box setting. Best
viewed in color.
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Fig. 4: A linearly separable two-class classification problem,
highlighting the saturation of the softmax output, as opposed to
the logit values, which keep increasing. Best viewed in color.
increases. However, the softmax output, after a certain point,
remains the same and bounded.
Another demonstration of the aforementioned limitation of
the softmax function for natural images can be observed in
Fig. 2. In this figure, we provide an original image, classified
as arctic fox with a confidence value of 0.99, and three
adversarial counterparts, all of which are classified as radio
with a confidence value of 1, and where classification is done
by a pretrained ResNet-50 [1]. All three adversarial examples
have been over-optimized in order to produce increasing logits
at each step. However, the softmax output for all of them
remains the same, masking the increase in the logit values.
In Fig. 3, we present observations for multiple adversarial
examples, showing the mean and the confidence interval of
the highest logit value of 1000 adversarial examples and their
corresponding softmax output. The 1000 adversarial examples
were generated by making use of I-FGS and the L2 version of
the CW, using 100 optimization steps in a white-box setting.
For I-FGS, we perturb the image one pixel at a time, and for
CW, we use K = 40 in Eq. 1. The increase in the logit values
for I-FGS is less pronounced than for CW since I-FGS relies
on the signature of the gradient, which removes the precision
in the perturbation between pixels. On the other hand, the
spike in the confidence for I-FGS appears faster than for
CW because the latter comes with a multi-class optimization
nature and implements an extensive search process. Fig. 3
clearly shows the masking effect of softmax, given that the
confidence almost immediately jumps to 100% after only
a couple of iterations, making it from this point onwards
impossible to differentiate between consecutive adversarial
examples, whereas logit values keep increasing over the course
of the optimization.
The results provided in Fig. 3 can be generalized to other
targeted iterative adversarial example generation methods [5,
9, 4, 8, 16]. These iterative methods make it possible to further
optimize an adversarial example (in terms of the logits), even
after obtaining full confidence. However, once the prediction
confidence is mapped to one, it is impossible to differentiate
between the next iterations of the adversarial example based
on the softmax output. Indeed, as the corresponding softmax
input (i.e., logit values) keeps increasing, the softmax output
will remain the same.
We refer the reader to our previous work which details the
masking effect of the softmax function in the case of both
single-target and multi-target adversarial attacks [21].
IV. IDENTIFYING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Targeted attacks, in every form, focus on maximizing an
activation; for neural networks, this activation is the logit value
for a particular class. Unless this optimization is stuck in
a local maximum, we can say that g(θ,xi+1)c ≥ g(θ,xi)c,
where c is the targeted class. If x is a data point that is the
subject of box constraints, then this activation can only be
maximized up to a certain point. Let xr be a hypothetical
genuine image that achieves the highest logit value for its
category in supervised settings. We are interested in finding
the numerical value of g(θ,xr)c, as this will allow us to label
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(b) Dataset: CIFAR-10
Model: Extended LeNet-5
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(c) Dataset: ImageNet
Model: VGG-16
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(d) Dataset: ImageNet
Model: ResNet-50
Fig. 5: Density plots of logit values of the prediction for ten classes, observed for both seen and unseen examples of the
(a) MNIST, (b) CIFAR-10, and (c), (d) ImageNet datasets. We used LeNet-5 with ReLU activation [20], Extended LeNet-5
[12, 14], VGG-16 [22], and ResNet-50 [1] to obtain these results. For ImageNet, ten classes were selected randomly. Our
models achieved 98%, 80%, 70.5%, and 77% top-1 accuracy on the respective datasets. These results are comparable to the
results presented in [1, 12, 14, 22].
Dataset (Model) 1.5 IQR 2 IQR 3 IQR 4 IQR 5 IQR kmin
MNIST (LeNet-5) 0.1% 0.004% 0% 0% 0% 2.2
CIFAR-10 (Extended LeNet-5) 1.7% 0.6% 0.07% 0.01% 0% 4.9
ImageNet (VGG-16) 1.1% 0.3% 0.03% 0.004% 0% 4.6
ImageNet (ResNet-50) 0.7% 0.1% 0.009% 0% 0% 3.9
ImageNet (Inception-v3) 1.2% 0.4% 0.07% 0.001% 0% 4.9
TABLE I: Percentage of genuine images incorrectly identified as outliers, as obtained for different values of k in the following
calculation: g(θ,x)
?
> Q3 + k IQR. Thresholds are calculated from correctly classified training examples for each class and
tested on both training and test examples. kmin is the smallest value of k needed to ensure that none of the examples in the
training and the test set are incorrectly identified as outliers.
any data point that produces a higher logit value than this
value as an adversarial example without any further evaluation.
To that end, in order to come up with an effective method to
estimate g(θ,xr)c, we first analyze the prediction distributions
of genuine images in terms of logit values.
A. Logit Distributions
In order to come up with a robust method for countering
adversarial examples (that is, a method that works for all
models across all datasets), we first analyze the logit dis-
tribution of genuine images. A reoccurring problem in the
field of adversarial examples is the usage of low-resolution
images to show the effectiveness of a defense mechanism.
Indeed, not all of the defense techniques for low-resolution
images transfer to high-resolution images [14]. For this reason,
we investigate the effectiveness of our method for MNIST,
as well as for CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. In this context, we
present Fig. 5, which shows the densities of predicted logit
values for correctly classified samples of ten classes taken from
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet, for both training and test
datasets. In the case of ImageNet, we present the distribution
for both VGG-16 and ResNet-50. We can observe that the
distributions of the logit values change between different
datasets and between different classes/labels. On top of that,
the distributions are vastly different for different architectures
(VGG-16 and ResNet-50), even when the same dataset is used.
Keeping the aforementioned observations in mind, we arrive
at the following conclusions: (a) the proposed method should
be distribution-free so that it can be generalized across multi-
ple datasets and multiple models, and (b) since the distribution
of logit values also changes between different classes, the
computational complexity of the proposed method should be
low.
B. Determining the Threshold
Considering that datasets only contain a limited number
of representations (per class), it is highly unlikely that the
hypothetical genuine image that attains the highest activation
is present in the dataset. However, we can estimate a threshold
based on the activations of the observations at hand. A critical
point in determining this threshold is to make sure that none of
the existing images in the dataset is labeled as adversarial, as it
is more important not to cast doubt on good observations than
to miss an outlier [23, 24]. The same point is also highlighted
by [14] when evaluating defense mechanisms.
As we showed previously, the logit value distributions are
vastly different. Hence, when identifying outliers, we want
to avoid any method that (implicitly or explicitly) makes
assumptions on the data distribution. Therefore, based on the
idea of boxplots, we propose using the interquartile range
(IQR) to determine the threshold for identifying outliers (i.e.,
identifying adversarial examples). The IQR is defined as the
difference between the 75th percentile (Q3) and the 25th
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(b) Dataset: CIFAR-10
Model: Extended LeNet-5
Fig. 6: Illustration of adversarial subspaces with high logit values for (a) MNIST and (b) CIFAR-10. Logit value distributions
of the predictions for the genuine images from the training set are given in the form of boxplots. The calculated thresholds
and the highest logit value of the adversarial examples generated with I-FGS and the CW are highlighted as red, blue, and
black lines, respectively. The adversarial spaces found using our method are indicated with arrows. Best viewed in color.
percentile (Q1): IQR = Q3−Q1. In basic statistical analysis,
outliers are generally defined as those points that lie beyond
the whiskers of the boxplot (i.e., below Q1−k IQR or above
Q3 + k IQR). Traditionally, k is set to 1.5 [25], in which
case the outliers are referred to as mild. We are, of course,
only interested in large positive outliers. In this context, the
authors of [23], [24], and [25] recommend using k = 3 for
determining extreme outliers (i.e., highly unusual data points).
Since we do not exactly know the underlying distribution of
the logits, we experiment with different k values.
For each class, we calculate Q3 + k IQR as the threshold
from the training sets of the aforementioned datasets and we
present the percentage of misidentified images for the test
datasets. Specifically, in Table I, we show the percentage of
genuine images that are misindentified as outliers (i.e., adver-
sarial examples) by the calculation g(θ,x)
?
> Q3 + k IQR,
for different values of k. In the case of ImageNet, we present
results for three different architectures, namely, VGG-16,
ResNet-50, and Inception-V3 [22, 1, 26]. Based on these
results, we can observe that k = 3 is mostly sufficient for most
of the architectures, as the percentage of misidentified genuine
images is, at most, as low as 0.07% (this corresponds to only
35 images in the test dataset of ImageNet). Nevertheless, it is
also reasonable to prefer a threshold that does not reject any
genuine image at all. In that regard, we can easily find kmin for
different datasets and models, given that the proposed method
is non-parametric in nature, which makes it straightforward
to adopt this method for different problems. Additionally, by
using the IQR instead of parameters such as the mean or
standard deviation, which are sensitive to outliers and which
make implicit assumptions about the underlying distributions,
the proposed method is also more robust (i.e., not attracted
by outliers). In the next section, we present experiments that
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Fig. 7: Illustration of adversarial subspaces with high activa-
tion for the ImageNet dataset using ResNet-50. Logit value
distributions of the predictions for the genuine images from
the training set are given in the form of boxplots. The calcu-
lated thresholds and the highest logit value of the adversarial
examples generated with I-FGS and the CW are highlighted as
red, blue, and black lines, respectively. The adversarial spaces
found using our method are indicated with arrows. Note that
the y-axis is log-scaled for clarity. Best viewed in color.
show how the proposed method can be effectively used to
detect over-optimized adversarial examples.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Using T = Q3+k IQR, we calculated logit thresholds that
do not leave out any genuine images for MNIST, CIFAR-10,
and ImageNet, using the kmin values given in Table I. For each
of the selected classes in those datasets (all classes in the case
of MNIST and CIFAR-10; ten randomly selected classes in
the case of ImageNet), we generate 500 adversarial examples
using I-FGS and the L2 version of the CW, totalling up to
5000 adversarial examples for each dataset, with the aim of
finding an adversarial example that generates the highest logit
value for that class. By doing so, we want to determine the
space for which we can identify all adversarial examples that
lie between the proposed threshold and the produced logit limit
for the adversarial example generation methods.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show the results obtained for MNIST,
CIFAR-10, and ImageNet (with ResNet-50), with the predicted
logit values given in the form of boxplots and with the calcu-
lated thresholds highlighted with red lines. The adversarial
examples that generate the highest logit prediction values
are highlighted separately for the two adversarial example
generation methods, using a blue line for I-FGS and a black
line for CW. We annotate the space between the proposed
threshold (red) and the maximum logit value for each adver-
sarial example generation method gc(θ,x) > T to show that
we can immediately identify numerous adversarial examples
within this space, no matter which method is used to generate
these adversarial examples. As expected, for all three datasets,
the CW generates stronger adversarial examples that produce
higher logit values than I-FGS.
Note that, as the image resolution increases, the upper limit
for the logit values that can be produced by an adversarial
example also increases. From MNIST to CIFAR-10, this limit
increases by a factor of 7, and from MNIST to ImageNet, this
limit increases by a factor of 200. In the case of the ImageNet
dataset, the increase is so high that we present the y-axis of
the graph in the base ten logscale for the sake of readability.
A. Feasibility for Higher Resolution Images
As shown by Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, when the resolution of an
image increases, the space in which adversarial examples can
be generated also increases in a significant way. This property
is also highlighted by other studies [27].
Let us define, for a given model, the effectiveness of our
method as
DAdv =
1
M
M∑
c=1
g(θ, (xAdv)c)c − Tc
g(θ, (xAdv)c)c
, (2)
where M is the number of classes in the dataset, c is the
current target class, (xAdv)c is the adversarial example that
produces the highest logit value when targeting class c, and
Tc = (Q3 + kmin IQR)c is the calculated threshold for the
targeted class. For each class, we calculate the space between
the threshold Tc and the logit value of (xAdv)c and normalize
it by dividing by the length of the total space. This value
corresponds to the proportion of the adversarial space for
class c with respect to the size of the total target class that
we can detect by our method. We then take the average over
all classes to get an approximate idea of the proportion of
the adversarial space we can detect in function of the total
dataset. Thanks to the normalization factor, DAdv will allow
us to compare different dataset/model combinations, where a
Dataset (Model) Image kmin Space Covered
Resolution DAdv ∈ [0, 1]
MNIST (LeNet-5) 1× 28× 28 2.2 26%
CIFAR-10 (Ext. LeNet-5) 3× 32× 32 4.9 68%
ImageNet (VGG-16) 3× 224× 224 4.6 75%
ImageNet (ResNet-50) 3× 224× 224 3.9 79%
ImageNet (Inception-v3) 3× 299× 299 4.9 89%
TABLE II: Approximate proportion of the number of adversar-
ial examples detected in each dataset (calculated using Eq. 2).
higher number indicates a higher effectiveness of detecting
adversarial examples.
Applying this formula allows us to construct Table II,
which shows the proportion of potential adversarial examples
detected. Based on the results presented in Table II, we observe
that the proposed method is able to detect more adversarial
examples when the resolution of an image is higher.
B. Scalability and Computational Cost
In Section IV-B, we noted that the thresholds must be calcu-
lated individually for each class. Naturally, when the number
of classes increases, the number of thresholds that must be
calculated also increases. However, since these thresholds only
need to be calculated and stored once, the computational cost
of the proposed method is small; it only requires one full
forward pass over the train dataset, after which the thresholds
can be used indefinitely.
Another strength of the proposed method is the easiness
with which thresholds can be updated. When the size of a
training set increases (thanks to an influx of additional data),
the thresholds can simply be re-calculated.
C. Defense Against Adversarial Examples
In Section V and Section V-A, we put the emphasis on the
number of potential adversarial examples countered using the
proposed method. However, only using the proposed method
is not a viable option to identify all adversarial examples. This
is especially true in white-box settings, for which it is easy
to come up with an attack that would bypass our method.
Indeed, one can simply introduce a logit constraint when
generating adversarial examples, making sure the generated
adversarial examples produce lower logit values than the
proposed thresholds. Nonetheless, our intention in proposing
this method is not to use it as a universal method for detecting
all adversarial examples, but rather to add it to a particular
defense workflow as a first (and computationally inexpensive)
line of defense for identifying adversarial examples, with these
adversarial examples producing unnatural logit values that are
beyond the reach of any genuine images.
Applying the proposed method ensures that adversarial
example generation methods will be limited not only by the
amount of perturbation and the discretization constraint, but
also by the maximum logit value produced by an adversarial
example. This will limit the search space extensively, espe-
cially when the resolution of the images under consideration
is large, as is shown in Section V-A.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this paper, we established the fundamentals for the use
of logit values as an indicator of adversariality. To that end,
we first discussed the masking effect of the softmax function,
showing that the logit values keep increasing, even after
softmax output achieving its maximum value of one during
the generation of adversarial examples.
Next, we laid out examples of logit distributions from
multiple datasets and showed the need for a distribution-
free method to identify adversarial examples, leading to the
introduction of a non-parametric and computationally cheap
technique for detecting over-optimized adversarial examples.
Throughout this paper, we presented experimental results for
MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet, also using different neural
network architectures.
The main purpose of the newly introduced defense tech-
nique is to further limit the expressiveness of methods for
adversarial example generation, not only in terms of pertur-
bation amount, but also in terms of logits. This allows our
technique to be used as a first line of defense, before triggering
a well-rounded one that is more complex in nature. Therefore,
future research may focus on investigating the compatibility
of our technique with other defense mechanisms that are
complimentary in nature.
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